make eos great again!
keep fighting!
Instead of waiting for Spanish Eden to reach a similar size of English Eden, it seems better to bring them in earlier but at a Level of similar size. For example, if English Eden is 10,000 members, then each of the 10 Level 2 representatives have 1,000 people behind them, same size as the Spanish Eden.
Could new Edens be brought into established Edens that are willing to have them early, but bring them in at an appropriately sized Level?
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It seems there is an assumption here that each community (really sub-community) is considered to have equal influence and impact to the larger Eden community co-existing on the same platform (i.e. sharing inflation and making governance decisions impacting their host blockchain). The idea that they share equal amounts of inflation makes that very obvious.
But I think even the requirement to reach unanimous agreement on blockchain changes subtly relies on that assumption. Just consider the following thought experiment. Assume that there are already two sub-communities (let’s call them A and B) of relatively equal influence and number of members that already exist. Both are sufficiently large to meet the threshold for existing as a sub-community (let’s say they both have 10,000 members). Now 1,000 members of sub-community B get the bright idea to secede from B and form a new sub-community C. This gives them more influence over governance decisions on the blockchain (not to mention a considerably larger share of the inflation funds than what they controlled acting within sub-community B). Now in negotiations on blockchain governance, sub-community C representatives can threaten to hold back progress on governance unless concessions are made in their favor. Those 1,000 members making up sub-community C now effectively have the same leverage to get compromises in their favor as the 9,000 members remaining in sub-community B. But if they had stayed they would have been forced to compromise with the other members that are 9 times their size, and because of the size disparity they are significantly less likely to have gotten their interests represented by whoever the representative is coming out of the Hierarchical Governance (HiGov) election process from sub-community B. It is clearly to their advantage to split into a new sub-community if they can in order to get more influence in the blockchain governance process. The incentives disappear when they have all split enough that all remaining sub-communities are of roughly equal size not much greater than the minimum threshold to form a sub-community.
In addition, doesn’t the self-selection afforded to members by allowing them to easily create their own sub-communities counteract the benefits of randomly selecting from large groups to tap into the wisdom of the crowds and to counteract the ease of collusion, regulatory capture, formation of party systems and the like?
That said, obviously the right of a member to secede from a sub-community they do not like is paramount. Though I believe that they should post a sufficiently large bond to join a community and though they can leave at any time, their bond should remained locked for some time so that there is sufficient capital to seize if a dispute resolution process finds that they violated community rules shortly before seceding but the process was only able to get to that ruling some time after they seceded. This ensures they actually do have skin in the game while they remain a community member given the practical realities of how long it takes to actual go through a dispute resolution process and get a final judgement.
Of less, but still significant, importance is for them to be allowed to form their own new sub-community that can participate in the greater community governance process (for example the one that decides on blockchain governance decisions or on how to split the available stream of funds among sub-communities). But the rules for forming such a sub-community could be strict and furthermore I don’t believe it makes sense to just give them privileges of equal influence to other more significant (by whatever metrics one cares about) existing sub-communities. It is not clear to me though what the rules governing that should be to mitigate against abuse and avoid creating perverse incentivizes like the above.
I would like to see more exploration into how governance could work at the level of these sovereign sub-communities (maybe there is something analogous to the international relations among sovereign states?). In particular, what would be a more reasonable way of coming to consensus on the relative importance and influence between sub-communities of different size and how inflation funds should be fairly divided among them to avoid incentivizing incessant splitting of sub-communities until it reaches a flat structure of an untenably large number of sub-communities which can each unilaterally hold back any progress of blockchain governance with a single veto (the probability of that gets very close to one when the number of actors that can unilaterally veto progress gets to a very large number).
Perhaps one approach may be to instead apply HiGov among the representatives of each of those sub-communities to determine a smaller number of leaders that handle blockchain governance. But then I think this is just a degenerate case that is effectively equivalent to enforcing only a single community except that people are allowed to severely constrain the random selection/grouping aspect within the first three levels of the HiGov process via self-selection into sub-communities which I think would somewhat counter many of the benefits of randomness in HiGov progress mentioned earlier.
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I think judy of defis is a good candidate
Count me in ! Great 
C doesn’t automatically qualify for inflation. If NYC decided to secede from NY it doesn’t automatically get promoted to a state. The remaining states would have to accept NYC as a peer.
So, to split the broader community solely on languages may risk widening information/culture/politics gap and then causing even more distrust.
I suggest that language should not be a mandated requirement. People have the freedom to join the community if they prove that they can communicate with others. Actually, with the help of AI translators and members who speak multiple languages, it’s not impossible to communicate with members speaking other languages.
What I meant by this is a special case of 2 community. Once you have 4 top level peers it would become 2/3+1. As it grows you would use hi gov to select a leader.
And presumably also they don’t get veto power until they are accepted as a peer.
And what would the governance process be for them to be accepted as a peer. Would it have to be unanimous agreement among all existing peers to include the new group as a peer (possibly with some initial level of inflation)? What if they want their inflation share to change? That also requires unanimous agreement among all peers (now including the one that was recently accepted in)?
How do you see this top-level of governance scaling? Do you believe it will remain at a relatively small number of peers?
EDIT: These questions were more or less answered above: https://forums.eoscommunity.org/t/eos-governance-draft-proposal-part-2/1274/28
Oh got it. The special case hid the more general pattern there. That does sound better.
I would figure that out in the future it is really no different than getting two people to agree to add a third and agree on new governance rules using initial rules.
In eos case, the bp would get to decide.
If not by language, how do you propose organizing communities within the EOS community? For example, were you thinking a developer community, token holder community, libertarian community, etc.?
If the broader community is divided, they may have disagreement on the inflation allocation.
What if one community (say Chinese community) have more members than other communities? Will it receive more allocation? If it will, other communities may complain about that. If it won’t, why a sub community with more members can only have relatively tight budgets. If there is only one community, this dilemma can be avoided.
No, I’m thinking that there should be only one community. No split.
No. This undermines democracy. Do you give the fat guy more votes just because he is bigger? Should CA rule the USA? Inflation / budget is just an economic vote.
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I would request that you read my book and then come back and tell me if you still have the same opinion and why?
You must be careful not to create political parties by allowing free association of groups. It will undermine the whole process. Geography is best and automatically captures most of the language issues.
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老铁，让Judy也来论坛。去社区多宣传。
That makes sense, thanks.