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EOS Community Governance Proposal Draft

If they cannot agree then the funds remain untouched until the next election.

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Anything is better than nothing, I’d like to trust Dan and give max 100 EOS if for EOS foundation.

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If you were to elect me, I would use the money to build better API nodes and general query infrastructure for EOS while improving the EOS website and marketing materials. I would fund teams building critical wallets, DeFi, and account creation services. That is the tip of the iceberg.

What gets funded is ENTIRELY up to the people participating.

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Along with a single member, an option to from self arranged small group( of max size 3; hackathon style) could be efficient in deploying the capital.

如果代表直接把这笔钱分给所有选他的人,好像能得到更多人的支持?但是这样会有助于EOS的发展吗?

If elected official directly distributes the money to all those who choose him, it seems that more people can support him? But will this help the development of EOS?

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The first thing is that it only takes one person to report the bribe attempt to community dispute resolution.

The second is do you trust them to follow through?

Third do you think everyone at higher levels will also sellout ?

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The community grows by only inviting people who are generally trusted to uphold the values of community.

It only takes 3 people to stop the abuse.

Randomness prevents corruption from colluding and gaining a foothold.

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As someone who participated in the ICO, built multiple EOSIO apps, ran a block producer, coordinated the launch of the mainnet, attempted to get the EOS Foundation off the ground, and who has worked to try to facilitate and foster cooperation between all of the various EOSIO entities and projects - I want to say “thank you” for starting this conversation.

I am looking forward to progressing and evolving this idea with you.

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To ensure the safety of fund-raising, it will not be misappropriated by others

The proposal is interesting although has quite a few presumptions.

1- " Those who are in the community are committed to support the outcome of the governance process…".

There is probably is large silent minority (ex: hackers, etc…) that aims to infiltrate a community by acting as if they are in favour of advancing the community but in fact are opportunistic.

2- “A true democracy is created on the basis of “invitation” where new members must be accepted by the group and must in turn voluntarily agree to be part of the group.”

This is absolutely NOT the definition of a democracy. Democracy implies diversity. If my membership in a community is contingent on being invited and accepted by others, this will result in a highly homogeneous community, which by the same logic, is NOT accepting of those with different views. I cannot stress enough how much of a disadvantage it is to wait for an invitation or acceptance to be part of a “democratic” community.

3- I agree that participation in governance should not have the sole prerequisite of token ownership.

4- Regarding the eviction process, the threshold is set too low. I can easily collude with 3-5 other members to remove a member that I simply dislike or one that has a view opposite to mine. The threshold must be so much higher. Think “guilty beyond any reasonable doubt”. In my opinion that means that a substantial majority finds the individual fake. I have been called a fake or bot many times by so many people simply because my views were not what they were preaching, which in my opinion was biased and unsupported statements.

5- There are quite a few hard constants throughout the proposal, which I am not a fan of. I always like thinking in terms of proportions.

6- Regarding the Authority Hierarchy, the 8/10 threshold is quite high here, especially as you go up the levels. For example, not everyone may wish to be an elected member in Level , but all those who pass that Level 1 are more likely than not to vote for themselves in Level 2, 3 etc… This means that the 8/10 hurdle will be harder and harder to achieve, and in many cases may never be achieved. So you will get to an impasse. That is why I always like to think in terms of majority (proportion) rather than hard coded constants.

These are just my two (or six) cents.

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I went on a walk with my wife and realized that this governance system should result in an ~80% approval rating of how the funds are being spent. This means that a super majority would enjoy being a part of the community. Very few should feel the cynical pinings of the powerless outsider. Instead, most people should feel the excitement of empowerment as they realize their voice matters.

Perhaps I should be more skeptical of the execution risk on this, but I feel like this walk was a significant aha moment for me. The value of the network is directly tied to the approval rating of the citizens, and a governance process that enables 80% approval rating is a lot of value.

My wife said that she’s never been interested in engaging with the EOS community before (despite all my excitement). She’s never felt like her voice mattered. She was the powerless outsider. But when I described this governance process to her, she felt empowered to be a part of the community. Not sure if her enthusiasm will stick, but it’s a promising indicator for the possible network effects to come should this work.

I now think a super majority approval rating of a blockchain may be the most important long term factor for market cap. Metcalfe’s Law and all that.

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The 10 EOS could be a variable based on token price per year.

OR

A smart contract could take a yearly snapshot for all EOS accounts and determine the average balance. From this, the election buy in could be assigned as a percentage like 1% of the average account balance. Assuming a decent distribution of funds from whales to shrimp this could be a fairer way to do it.

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So we should let everyone in the world vote in US elections?

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Or the community governance process can set the threshold.

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I think we’re actually encouraging this. The idea is to get the model out there and refine it. However anyone can then use it if they want to. It wouldn’t always need to be a challenger necessarily. I could see an EOS App association forming an advocacy group to support their unique interests with this format. It’s an obvious opportunity for any eosio based chain to use it. There could be other groups based on their industry, like a DeFi advocacy group, etc.

In fact, I’d like to see this format get to a point whereby there are maybe 8-10 major groups in the community like this and we form an additional counsel that works on ideas to bring the entire community closer together and it has a representative from each group sitting at the table. Like an EOS Community UN.

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This is valuable feedback. Thanks for sharing.

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The Byzantine fault tolerant threshold is 2/3+1. Failure to reach consensus means they don’t earn their individual budget. So there is opportunity cost to deadlock.

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Promising. A community of communities. I enjoyed reading these ideas in More Equal Animals, but envisioning them in immediate practice is even better.

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I generally dislike constants too. That said, this is a draft to point in a direction. Please share constants you would change

I like the general direction. Getting some funds into the hands of some people willing to put it to work for the community is imperative… hopefully this wouldn’t be a long drawn out process.

I think some sort of community member bonding might be needed, where an eviction has some deterrent. People will test your limits if there isn’t money on the line.

There’s a wealth of information we learned with building a full product from start to finish using a DAC (vigor), and I’m always open to help out in any possible way. Glad to see you more active Dan!

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